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On the Rhetorical Criticism of
Judge Posner
By JAMES ARNT AUNE*
Perhaps the best commentary on the rhetoric of United States
Supreme Court Justice Rufus Peckham in Lochner v. New York1 was
made by Oliver Wendell Holmes in a letter to Felix Frankfurter in
1922. In that letter Justice Holmes wrote that "emotional predilec-
tions somewhat governed [Justice Peckham] on social themes."'2 Cer-
tainly the most interesting recent commentary on Lochner is the
rhetorical analysis of Justice Holmes's dissent in Richard Posner's
Law and Literature.' Posner, the Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit
and a leader of the "Law and Economics" movement, at first sounds a
bit like Justice Peckham himself. He writes:
Would the dissent in Lochner have received a high grade in a
law school examination in 1905? I think not. It is not logically
organized, does not join issue sharply with the majority, is not
scrupulous in its treatment of the majority opinion or of prece-
dent, is not thoroughly researched, does not exploit the factual
record, and is highly unfair to poor old Herbert Spencer.4
Posner further criticizes Justice Holmes for not dealing with the
Due Process Clause, the real heart of the constitutional argument, and
concludes:
It is not, in short, a good judicial opinion. It is merely the great-
est judicial opinion of the last hundred years. To judge it by
'scientific' standards is to miss the point. It is a rhetorical mas-
terpiece, and evidently rhetoric counts in law; otherwise the dis-
sent in Lochner would be forgotten.5
* Professor of Communication, The University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (March 28, 1922), quoted
in LIVA BAKER, THE JusTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THm LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES 417 (1991).
3. RIcHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988) [hereinafter LAW AND LrrERATURE].
4. Id. at 285.
5. Id. at 285-86.
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Most of the time when we analyze the relationships among polit-
ical, legal, and rhetorical theory, we are left with a few odd marginal
hints, such as Kant's brief dismissal of rhetoric in the third critique6 or
Marx's confession to his father about cooling his fevered brain by
translating parts of Aristotle's Rhetoric.7 It is rare for the student of
legal argument to find an explicit statement of an influential jurist's
method of rhetorical criticism as well as a provocative reflection on
the nature of rhetoric itself, as Posner goes on to do in his recent
Overcoming Law.'
The purpose of this Essay is to examine Posner's rhetorical criti-
cism of the Justice Holmes dissent, compare that criticism with Pos-
ner's recent extension of his reflections on rhetoric in Overcoming
Law, and perhaps reinforce the claims of Edward Panetta and Marouf
Hasian in their recent analysis of Posner's "anti-rhetoric." 9 Posner's
discussion of rhetoric reveals how, as Morton Horwitz has noted,
"every complex legal system presents a structure of classification and
categorization that reveals many of its dominant concerns and points
of tension and contradiction."'10 This Essay is part of a larger intellec-
tual project. Besides contributing to what might one day be called a
"Law and Rhetoric" movement, the goal of this Essay is to use im-
plicit and explicit discussions of rhetoric in political, social, and legal
theory to explore the larger movement of arguments across particular
social formations, and to identify the peculiar usefulness of rhetorical
theorizing in exposing the strains and contradictions in ideological sys-
tems." Posner's impoverished view of rhetoric seems to go hand in
hand with his reification of the role of the market in law and politics.
Although Posner's self-conscious reflections on rhetoric come af-
ter his reading of the Justice Holmes dissent, I begin with the later
work for purposes of clarity. Posner's theory of rhetoric follows the
same conceptual path as his introduction of economics into legal anal-
ysis. First, he narrows the scope of the rhetorical enterprise to cost-
benefit analysis. He describes the persuader's choice of the available
means of persuasion in this way:
6. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 184-85 (J.H. Bernard, trans. 1951).
7. Letter from Karl Marx to his father (November 10-11, 1837), in KARL MAsx &
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. I at 18-19 (1975).
8. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 498-530 (1995).
9. Edward M. Panetta & Marouf Hasian, Jr., Anti-Rhetoric as Rhetoric: The Law and
Economics Movement, 42 Comm. Q. 1, 57-74 (1994).
10. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, Ti TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 10
(1992). For a good discussion of Justice Holmes, see id at 109-43. See also OVERCOMING
LAW, supra note 8, at 271-86.
11. See generally JAMES ARNT AUNE, RHETORIC AND MARXISM (1994).
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The persuader whose goal is fixed will choose that mixture of
rhetorical devices-including true information, lies, signals, and
emotional appeals-that, at least cost to himself will maximize
the likelihood of achieving that goal.... The cost of persuading
the audience depends on the distance between X and Y, where
Y is the audience's prior belief concerning the subject matter of
the speech.1
2
The difficulty of persuasion also depends on the tenacity with
which the audience's preexisting beliefs are held.13
Second, actual communication between speaker and audience is,
by a rhetorical sleight of hand, defined primarily in terms of informa-
tion. A speaker influences the beliefs of audiences in two ways: by
supplying information, which includes false as well as true informa-
tion, deductions, and inductions, and by "using signals of one sort or
another to enhance the credibility of the speaker's arguments-such
signals as speaking with great self-assurance or furnishing particulars
about oneself that make one seem a credible person."' 4 Posner notes
that this strategy usually comes first, in order to "place the audience in
a receptive mood," and states that, "[t]he creation of this receptive
mood was called in classical rhetoric the 'ethical appeal."
' 5
Posner's characterization of ethos as simply the creation of a re-
ceptive mood is simply wrong. Aristotle's Rhetoric defines ethos as a
mode of proof provided "in the character of the speaker," or, as
Thomas Farrell puts it, "the character of the speaker as it is mani-
fested in the speech."' 6 Posner apparently confuses ethos with pathos:
ignoring the significance of ethos means leaving out the historical and
cultural dimension of rhetoric. Posner cannot account for the role of
the orator as an embodiment of cultural ideals (although his reverence
for Justice Holmes suggests an implicit understanding of this dimen-
sion of ethos). 7 Nor can Posner account for the way in which excep-
tionally eloquent rhetorical texts such as Lincoln's "Second
Inaugural" enter into the public consciousness of a nation.
Third, Posner defines audience response, as well as the "utility"
of rhetoric, in terms of information costs. He accuses Donald McClos-
key and other advocates of rhetorical methods in economics of ignor-
12. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 500-01 (citations omitted).
13. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 500-01.
14. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 500.
15. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 500.
16. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 39, § 1356(a) (George A. Kennedy, trans. 1991);
THOMAS B. FARRELL, NORMS OF RHETORICAL CULTURE 41 (1993).
17. See RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 101 (1983).
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ing "the significance of the costs of information to the rhetorician's
audience":'8
The average scientific paper is less 'rhetorical,' in a perfectly in-
telligible sense of that word, than the average political address
or the average closing argument to a jury. The reason is that the
cost of information is much lower to a scientific audience for a
scientific paper than, for example, to the lay audience of a politi-
cian's speech on macroeconomics or foreign policy. The higher
an audience's cost of absorbing information, the more a speaker
will rely on forms of persuasion that avoid taxing the audience's
absorptive capacity and thus minimize the cost."9
Posner, who ostensibly is an admirer of Protagoras, here rein-
scribes an essentially Platonic view of rhetoric in which clear lines are
drawn between rhetoric and science. Not only does such line-drawing
ignore the enduring role of rhetorical masterpieces in sustaining a na-
tion's public consciousness, it also obscures insight into the rhetorical
tools used by scientists to address audiences with low information
costs. McCloskey's comparative historical analysis of changes in the
"implied author" of economic articles from the historian/philosopher
of 1929 to the mathematician of 1989 is but one example of the uses of
rhetorical analysis of economic "science. '20
Fourth, Posner rigidly separates rhetoric from ethics. After a
rather breathless analysis of Plato's Gorgias and Aristotle's rhetoric,
he concludes that one simply should "try to place a normative evalua-
tion on legal.., advocacy in gross."121 He also notes in a parenthesis
that "[t]he efforts of the defenders of rhetoric to do so may be one
reason for the low esteem in which the discipline is held. Poor rhetori-
cians they, they overargue their case."'  "When rhetoric is moralized,
rhetorical analysis of judicial opinions turns into the old lawyers' game
of congratulating the judges who agree with you; and it becomes im-
possible to remark the rhetorical prowess of a Hitler."23 In these
passages, the voice of Justice Holmes begins to come out very clearly.
Just as Justice Holmes had rigorously attempted to separate law and
morality in The Common Law, Posner wishes to do the same with
rhetoric and morality.'
18. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 502.
19. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 503.
20. See generally DONALD McCLoSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOM-
ics (1994). See especially chapters 9-13.
21. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 516.
22. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 516.
23. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 528.
24. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 38 (1881).
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It is simply wrong to characterize rhetoricians as playing the old
lawyers' game: Posner has constructed a straw version of "morality" as
a simplistic answer to questions of right and wrong. Aristotle under-
stood, as did generations of rhetoricians, philosophers, and lawyers
after him, that politics, law, and ethics are inextricably linked by the
human capacity for reasoning. Posner is right that there is a lot of bad
rhetorical criticism that simply attacks the rhetor for not adhering to
the critic's prejudices, but surely he knows that it is possible to ex-
amine the ethical reasoning of a rhetor respectfully without agreeing
with it. Posner's objection applies equally to his own rhetoric in Over-
coming Law, which is full of dismissive epithets ("rhetoric prigs")
cloaked in the guise of scientific judgments.
Fifth, Posner rigidly separates rhetoric and science. The rhetori-
cian discovers nothing: "the rhetorician doesn't stick his neck out. No
Socrates, he is respectful of public opinion, or less politely the
prejudices of his audience. That is one reason why the literature of
rhetoric is duller than that of science or philosophy."'  Much of rhet-
oric, in contrast to science, depends on the ability to parry an oppo-
nent's rhetorical thrusts. Also, "science tends to falsify false
propositions, and thus to promote truth, whereas rhetoric has no such
tendency."26
A final criticism of Posner lies in his selective writing of the his-
tory of rhetorical theory. Posner's is a history of rhetoric from which
Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, among others, are absent. He con-
structs a history of rhetoric in which the "extremes" of Plato and Aris-
totle are seen as unrealistic, leaving the sophistic rhetoric of
Protagoras as winner by default. Legal rhetoric in the West, much like
law itself, is largely a creature of the Roman rhetoricians, who com-
bined a sophistic attention to effectiveness with a philosophical view
of ethics and politics.
There are other criticisms of Posner's rhetoric, including the re-
duction of argument to communication of information; the elimina-
tion of cultural tradition as a factor in ethical appeal; the ignoring of
the role of the audience (as well as the presence of multiple audi-
ences) in negotiating rhetorical meaning; the simplistic and "literary"
focus on the single speech text, and the unrealistic depiction of an
essentially unidirectional flow of information from speaker to
audience.
25. OVERCOMiNG LAW, supra note 8, at 528.
26. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 8, at 529.
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However, just as Posner is a skillful persuader in spite of his im-
poverished view of rhetoric (or, to put it another way, he is skillful in
adapting to audiences who find, among other things, equations a help-
ful mode of proof), perhaps Posner's own practice of rhetorical criti-
cism is better. A common defense of economic methods in law lies in
their practical usefulness in resolving conflicts, a defense that fits
nicely with Posner's own eloquent defense of pragmatism. In Law
and Literature, Posner tells iis that the rhetorical analysis of judicial
opinions may help us better understand the process by which such
decisions are written, and perhaps even to improve judicial opinion-
writing.27 In a fascinating chapter, Posner moves from analyzing
Yeats' "Second Coming," to Mark Antony's speech in Julius Caesar,
and then finally, to Justice Holmes' Lochner dissent.
I include the full text of Justice Holmes' dissent in part because of
its brevity and also because it will make it easier to locate certain
roads not taken in Posner's analysis. It reads as follows:
I regret sincerely that I am unable to agree with the judg-
ment in this case, and that I think it my duty to express my
dissent.
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain. It if were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not con-
ceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various
decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may
regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as
injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which equally
with this interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and
usury laws are ancient examples. A more modem one is the
prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he
likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to
do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known
writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by
every state or municipal institution which takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. The other day we sustained the Massachusetts
vaccination law.28 United States and state statutes and decisions
cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination are
familiar to this court.2g Two years ago we upheld the prohibi-
27. LAW AND LrrERATuRE, supra note 3, at 269.
28. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
29. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1905).
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tion of sales of stock on margins or for future delivery in the
constitution of California.30 The decision sustaining an eight
hour law for miners is still recent.31 Some of these laws embody
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some
may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a partic-
ular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.
General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The de-
cision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than
any articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition
just stated, if it is accepted, will carry us far toward the end.
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, un-
less it can be said that the statute proposed would infringe fun-
damental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. It does not need research
to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be passed
upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might think it a
proper measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly
could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first in-
stalment [sic] of a general regulation of the hours of work.
Whether in the latter aspect it would be open to the charge of
inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss.32
Posner's reading of Justice Holmes' dissent is rather straightfor-
ward, and certainly consistent with his later theoretical reflections on
rhetorical practice. Posner simply identifies strategies and omissions
of points of law.
First, Posner identifies the ethical appeal of Justice Holmes that is
established by a "serious and deferential tone" in the first sentence, a
rapid change of subject, and a bold statement about the role of eco-
nomic theory in the majority opinion. Posner writes that the force of
this appeal "lies in the assurance with which it is made. It puts the
reader on the defensive; dare he question a statement made with a
conviction so confident and serene? '33
30. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1905).
31. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1905).
32. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. LAW Am LIERATuRE, supra note 3, at 283-84.
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Second, this ethical appeal works because of the high information
costs of the audience: "Holmes' method is more effective because in
areas where our own knowledge is shaky we tend to take people at
their own apparent self-evaluation and thus to give more credence to
the confident than to the defensive."34
Third, Posner argues that Justice Holmes is being disingenuous by
adopting a "'simple man"' ethical appeal, since he was known to have
been quite conversant with laissez faire economic theory, and had
even adopted it himself.35
Fourth, the choice of "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" as a
metonymy for laissez faire is very concrete and effective.36
Finally, Posner notes that when Justice Holmes "finally" in-
troduces evidence (which in a one-page decision seems vaguely over-
stated), he employs it badly. Posner chooses the one bad precedent,
the vaccination case, to discuss in the text, arguing that vaccination
conveyed an external benefit to those who may catch the disease,
while the New York hours law did not. He does, magnanimously,
note below that Justice Holmes' other examples do work.37
Posner continues with the passage cited earlier,38 noting that Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent is not a good judicial opinion because of its lack
of logical order, its lack of clear opposition to the majority, its sparse
research, and its failure to use the factual record effectively in making
the argument. In calling it a great judicial opinion, he points to its
longevity, as well as to its "enchanting rhetoric" with all its "tricks,"
which have blinded us to the fact that the Supreme Court majority, by
striking down laws such as the New York law, probably "made the
United States marginally more prosperous than it would otherwise
have been."39 Posner also directs our attention to recent legal scholar-
ship which has attempted to rehabilitate the majority decision, includ-
ing an argument that the extension of First Amendment freedoms to
commercial speech is in line with Lochner.4°
34. LAW AND LrrERATuRE, supra note 3, at 283-84.
35. LAW AND LrrER Tu, supra note 3, at 283-84.
36. LAW AND LrInRATuR, supra note 3, at 284.
37. LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 284-85.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 3, at 286.
40. LAW AND LiTERATuRE, supra note 3, at 286 n.21. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMIENT DoMAIN 108-09, 128, 280-81
(1985).
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Finally, Posner uses Justice Holmes' decision in Buck v. Bell4 1-
the notorious Virginia sterilization case that concluded with the fa-
mous line, "Three generations of imbeciles is enough"-to illustrate
his thesis that "[s]cholarly analysis of the 'rhetoric' of judicial deci-
sions would be more fruitful, and certainly clearer, if scholars stopped
trying to equate good rhetoric with goodness."'42
Now, what is wrong with Posner's reading of Lochner? An exam-
ination of Justice Peckham's opinion, as well as Justice Harlan's dis-
sent, reveals that much of Justice Holmes' strategy can be understood
only in response to his colleagues as well as its direction to a larger
audience.
First, Posner directs our attention to the simultaneously arrogant
yet "plain man" ethos of Justice Holmes' introduction. Holmes' strat-
egy to me reads more like an echo of Justice Peckham's own opening
move, when he writes, "this is not a question of substituting the judg-
ment of the court for that of the legislature," 43 and yet goes on to say,
"we do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this
law."" Sir Frederick Pollock commented on Justice Peckham's tone
here as not giving credit "to the state legislature for knowing its own
business," and as treating it "like an inferior court which has to give
proof of its competence." 45
Second, Justice Holmes' "lack of evidence" for his argument that
the majority is using a particular economic theory makes more sense
when read against Justice Peckham's imputation of ulterior motives to
the New York legislature, where he argues that this is not a public
health but rather a labor law.46 Justice Holmes' seemingly ill-man-
nered tone towards his fellow justices must be compared to Justice
Peckham's treatment of the New York legislature. It is also important
to recall, as Justice Holmes must have known, that Justice Peckham
had in his forty-page opinion in Budd v. New York,4 7 attacked a stat-
ute setting rates for grain elevators as "vicious in its nature, commu-
nistic in its tendency." In this attack, Justice Peckham had cited not
Spencer, but Stanley Jevons's The State in Relation to Labor.'
41. 247 U.S. 200 (1927).
42. LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 289.
43. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
44. Id at 61.
45. 3 LAW Q. Rnv. 211 (1905).
46. 198 U.S. at 57.
47. 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
48. 117 N.Y. 1, 47 (1889).
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Third, Posner's own structuring of his argument is deeply rhetori-
cal, in his own limited sense. He heightens the weakest part of Justice
Holmes' legal reasoning, the supposed weakness of the vaccination
analogy, and deals with the strongest part only in a footnote.
Fourth, Posner misidentifies the "simple man" ethical appeal and
the rapid, overly authoritative style of the opinion as being appropri-
ate for audiences whose "own knowledge is shaky."4 9 The audience
for this opinion was not a potted plant. Note that in my earlier discus-
sion of Posner's rhetorical theory he defined the speaker to audience
transaction in terms of information costs. Yet there were multiple
audiences addressed by Justice Holmes' dissent, some present, some
future, some anticipated, some unanticipated. One audience was the
majority, the other the rest of the minority. Posner -never discusses
Justice Harlan's dissent, which was much more lawyerly and perhaps
freed Justice Holmes to make his own arguments. Justice Harlan's
dissent was also the original majority opinion, until one of the justices
changed his vote. Thus, the timing of Justice Holmes' dissent is of
some interest both to the rhetorician and the legal historian. 0 An-
other audience consisted of younger legal scholars for whom the
Lochner decision was the opening move in the development of Legal
Realism. Surely Justice Holmes knew, however limited his own opti-
mism for social reform, that his words would have some effect on the
larger progressive legal and political community. Interestingly, the la-
bor movement itself-an audience for whom the information cost
even of reading Justice Holmes' dissent was high, at least by Posner's
standards-used the Lochner decision as a justification for intensify-
ing strike action to gain the eight-hour day.51
We also know that Lochner became a symbol for Teddy
Roosevelt in his "New Nationalism" speech in 1912, and for the New
Deal reformers, later Supreme Court opinion-writers, as well as con-
servative opponents of "judicial activism." Those later audiences, like
Posner, are part of a larger tradition of argument and audience that is
not easily captured by the simple calculation of information costs. It is
here that both true conservatives and radicals can join in criticizing
the essentially ahistorical character of Posner's jurisprudence.
The most persuasive recent reading of the majority decision in
Lochner is by Howard Gillman and shows us that Justice Holmes' ac-
49. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
50. See Baker, supra note 2, at 416.
51. DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHmip S. FONER, OUR OWN TmE: A HISTORY OF AMERn-
CAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY 157-58 (1989).
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count of Justice Peckham's reasoning may not have done justice to its
consistency with the long American tradition of avoiding factionalism.
Gillman explains that the Lochner era Court upheld much more social
welfare legislation than it is usually credited with doing, and that it did
so on the basis of a distinction between state actions that advanced the
interests of the public as a whole and actions that served factions or
special interests.52 Using the rhetorically sensitive methods of Isaac
Kramnick, Frederick Pollock, and Joyce Appleby, Gillman demon-
strates how the Justices were constrained by something more than
mere rationalization of policy preferences. And Gillman also, by tak-
ing a longer view, is able to show how a rhetorical idiom such as Jus-
tice Peckham's collapses when confronted with massive social change
in audience experience. Since the frontier freehold was no longer
available as an escape valve for urban labor, labor and capital no
longer existed under conditions even roughly approximating republi-
can equality.
It also seems impossible to understand the stylistic texture of Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent without placing it within a larger tradition of
crafting public argument. When I first read Justice Holmes again after
many years I was struck by the similarity of his prose style to that of
Emerson's: they share the common characteristics of a lack of linear
progression, a preference for the sentence rather than the paragraph
as the unit of thought, and the simultaneous affectation of simplicity
and cosmopolitan irony. Therefore, I was not surprised when I read
about the Emerson-Holmes relationship in Baker's biography of Jus-
tice Holmes, in which she traced echoes of particular Emerson lines in
Justice Holmes' work.53
I have suggested an alternative reading of Justice Holmes' strat-
egy in his Lochner dissent, and that Posner's view of rhetoric is of a
piece with his larger "anti-rhetoric." This anti-rhetoric seeks to dis-
place the normative and political dimension of legal decisionmaking
into a "pragmatic vocabulary that remind[s] us of the limits of re-
sources (and rights)."54 Posner diminishes the historical and ethical
force of the rhetorical tradition by limiting the range of audience re-
sponse to arguments. There remains one point I am as yet unable to
answer, and that is Posner's invocation of what Richard Lanham calls
the "Q Question," after "its most famous nonanswerer," namely the
52. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: Tu- RIsE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
53. Baker, supra note 2, at 85.
54. Panetta & Hasian, supra note 9, at 71.
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connection between rhetoric and goodness.55 Can we reconcile Jus-
tice Holmes, the hero of Lochner and the free speech cases, with the
decision in Buck v. Bell? The answer will probably require more than
weighing utility-functions. It will probably require recovering the
links among rhetoric, law, ethics, and politics that pragmatism has at-
tempted to suppress.
55. RicHARD A. LAN-AM, THE ELECrRONIC WoRD: DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY,
AND Tfm ARTS 155 (1993).

